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Abstract
In this paper we investigate some properties of first order theo-
ries which prevent them from having universal models under certain
cardinal arithmetic assumptions. Our results give a new syntactical
condition, oak property, which is a sufficient condition for a theory
not to have universal models in cardinality λ when certain cardinal
arithmetic assumptions implying the failure of GCH (and close to the
failure of SCH) hold.
1
10 Introduction
The existence of a universal model of a theory has been the object of a
continuous interest to specialists in various disciplines of mathematics, see
for example [ArBe], [FuKo]. We approach this problem from the point of view
of model theory, more specifically, classification theory, and we concentrate
on first order theories. In a series of papers, Kojman-Shelah [KjSh 409] (see
there also for earlier references), [KjSh 447], Kojman [Kj], Shelah [Sh 457],
[Sh 500], Dzˇamonja-Shelah [DjSh 614], the thesis claiming the connection
between the complexity of a theory and its amenability to the existence of
universal models, has been pursued. As it follows from the classical results
in model theory (see [ChKe]) that if GCH holds, then every countable first
order theory admits a universal model in every uncountable cardinal, the
question we need to ask is what happens when GCH fails. It is usually
“easy” to force a situation in which there are no universal models (by adding
Cohen subsets), however assuming that GCH fails and allowing ourselves
a vague use of the words “many” and “often”, we can distinguish between
those theories which for many cardinals do not have a universal model in that
cardinal whenever GCH fails, and those for which it is possible to construct a
model of set theory in which GCH fails, yet our theory has a universal model
in the cardinality under consideration. This division would suggest that the
theories first described, let us call them for the sake of this introduction
amenable, are of higher complexity than the latter ones.
In his paper [Sh 500], S. Shelah introduced a hierarchy of complexity for
first order theories, and showed that past a certain level on that hierarchy,
the inherent properties of any theory on that level, will preclude the exis-
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tence of universal models in most cardinalities. The details of this hierarchy
are described in the following Definition 0.5, and what S. Shelah proved in
[Sh 500], is that SOP4 implies high non-amenability. Here we show that
this bound is not sharp, by defining a property of theories which is present in
some NSOP4 theories (meaning, not SOP4), yet it precludes the existence of
a universal model under certain cardinal arithmetic. This property is called
the oak property, as its prototype is the model completion of Th(Mλ,κ), a the-
ory connected to that of the tree κ≥λ (for details see Example 1.3). The oak
property cannot be made a part of the SOPn hierarchy, as we exhibit a the-
ory which has oak, and is NSOP3, while the model completion of the theory
of triangle free graphs is an example of a SOP3 theory which does not satisfy
the oak property. Our research is a continuation of section §1 of [Sh 457],
where the universality spectrum of the theory T ∗feq of infinitely many indexed
independent equivalence relations is investigated, and it is proved that under
cardinals arithmetic assumptions like the ones in our Theorem 2.1, T ∗feq does
not have universal models. We show that T ∗feq has the oak property, and in
fact exhibit a close connection between T ∗feq and Th(Mλ,κ).
We commence by giving some background notions which will be used in
the main sections of the paper. First, several classical definitions of model
theory.
Convention 0.1 A theory in this paper means a first order complete theory,
unless otherwise stated. Such an object is usually denoted by T .
Notation 0.2 Given a theory T , we let C = CT stand for “the monster
model”, i.e. a saturated enough model of T . As is usual, we assume without
loss of generality that all our discussion takes place inside some such model, so
all expressions to the extent “there is”, “exists” and “|=” are to be relativised
to this model, all models are ≺ C, and all subsets of C we mention have size
less than the saturation number of C. We let κ¯ = κ¯(CT ) be the size of C, so
this cardinal is larger than any other cardinal mentioned in connection with
T .
Definition 0.3 (1) The tuple b¯ is defined by ϕ(x¯; a¯) if ϕ(C; a¯) = {b¯}, i.e. if
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b¯ is the unique x¯ which realizes ϕ(x¯; a¯). It is defined by the type p if b¯ is the
unique tuple which realizes p. It is definable over A if tp(b¯, A) defines it.
(2) The formula ϕ(x¯; a¯) is algebraic if ϕ(C; a¯) is finite. The type p is
algebraic if it is realized by finitely many tuples only. The tuple b¯ is algebraic
over A if tp(b¯, A) is.
(3) The definable closure of A is
dcl(A)
def
= {b : b is definable over A}.
(4) The algebraic closure of A is
acl(A)
def
= {b : b is algebraic over A}.
(5) If A = acl(A), we say that A is algebraically closed. When dcl(A) and
acl(A) coincide, then cl(A) denotes their common value.
Definition 0.4 (1) For a theory T and a cardinal λ, models {Mi : i < i
∗}
of T , each of size λ, are jointly universal iff for every N a model of T of size
λ, there is an i < i∗ and an isomorphic embedding of N into Mi.
(2) For T and λ as above,
univ(T, λ)
def
= min{|F| : F is a family of jointly
universal models of T of size λ}.
(so univ(T, λ) = 1 iff there us a universal model of T of size λ.)
The following is the main definition of S. Shelah’s [Sh 500].
Definition 0.5 (Shelah, [Sh 500]) Let n ≥ 3.
(1) A formula ϕ(x¯, y¯) is said to exemplify the n-strong order property, SOPn
if lg(x¯) = lg(y¯), and there are a¯k for k < ω, each of length lg(x¯) such
that
(a) |= ϕ[a¯k, a¯m] for k < m < ω,
(b) |= ¬(∃x¯0, . . . , x¯n−1)[
∧
{ϕ(x¯l, x¯k) : l, k < n and k = l+1 mod n}].
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T has SOPn if there is a formula ϕ(x¯, y¯) exemplifying this.
(2) SOP≤n is defined similarly, except that in (b) we replace “n” by each
“m ≤ n”.
(3) NSOPn stands for the negation of SOPn.
Note 0.6 Using a compactness argument and Ramsey theorem, one can
prove that if T is a theory with SOPn and ϕ(x¯, y¯), and 〈a¯n : n < ω〉 exemplify
it, without loss of generality 〈a¯n : n < ω〉 is an indiscernible sequence. See
[Sh -c], or [GrIoLe] for examples of such arguments.
Example 0.7 The model completion of the theory of triangle-free graphs
is a prototypical example of a SOP3 theory, with the formula ϕ(x, y) just
stating that x and y are connected. It can be shown that this theory is
NSOP4, see [Sh 500].
The following fact indicates that SOPn(3 ≤ n < ω) form a hierarchy, and
the thesis is that this hierarchy is reflected in the complexity of the behavior
of the relevant theories under natural constructions in model theory.
Fact 0.8 (Shelah, [Sh 500], §2) SOPn+1 =⇒ SOPn.
1 An NSOP3 theory without universals
Definition 1.1 (1) Let T0 be the following theory in the language
{Q0, Q1, Q2, F0, F1, F2, F3} :
(i) Q0, Q1, Q2 are unary predicates which form a partition of the universe,
(ii) F0 is a partial function from Q1 to Q0,
(iii) F1 is a partial two-place function from Q2 ×Q0 to Q1.
(iv) F2 is a partial function from Q0 to Q2,
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(v) F3 is a partial function from Q2 to Q0,
(vi) F0(F1(z, x)) = x for all (z, x) ∈ Dom(F1), and
(vii) F3(F2(x)) = x for all x.
(2) Let T+0 be like T0, but with the requirement that F0, F1, F2 and F3 are
total functions.
Remark 1.2 It is to be noted that the above definition of T0 uses partial,
rather than the more usual, full function symbols. Using partial functions,
we have to be careful when we speak about submodels, where we have a
choice of deciding whether statements of the form “Fl(x) is undefined” are
preserved in the larger model. We choose to request that the fact that Fl is
undefined at a certain entry, is not necessarily preserved in the larger model.
Functions F2 and F3 are “dummies” whose sole purpose is to assure that
models of T+0 are non-trivial, while keeping T
+
0 a universal theory (which is
useful when discussing the model completion). Also note that neither T0 nor
T+0 is complete, but every model M of T0 in which Q
M
0 , Q
M
2 6= ∅ and F0 and
F3 are onto, can be extended to a model of T
+
0 with the same universe (Claim
1.4 (2)), and every model of T0 is a submodel of a model of T
+
0 (Claim 1.4(4)).
T+0 has a complete model completion (Claim 1.5). This model completion
is the main theory we shall work with and, as we shall show, it has the oak
property (Claim 1.11) and is NSOP 4 (Claim 1.7).
Example 1.3 An example which we take as the prototype of a model of T+0 ,
is a model M = Mλ,κ obtained when for given infinite cardinals κ, λ, we take
QM0 to be κ, Q
M
1 to be
κ>λ, and QM2 =
κλ. We let F0(η) be the length of η
for η ∈ Q1, and let F1(ν, α) = ν ↾ α. Let F3 be any surjective function from
QM2 onto Q
M
0 , and for α < κ let F2(α) = να for any να such that F3(να) = α.
Claim 1.4 (1) If M is a model of T+0 , then Q
M
0 , Q
M
1 and Q
M
2 are all non-
empty, and FM0 and F
M
3 are onto.
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(2) Every model M of T0 in which Q
M
0 6= ∅ and Q
M
2 6= ∅, while F0 and F3
are onto, can be extended to a model of T+0 with the same universe
(and every model of T+0 is a model of T0).
(3) There are models M of T0 with Q
M
0 6= ∅ and Q
M
2 6= ∅ and F
M
3 onto,
which cannot be extended to a model of T+0 with the same universe.
(4) Every model of T0 is a submodel of a model of T
+
0 .
(5) T+0 has the amalgamation property and the joint amalgamation property
JEP .
(6) If M |= T0 and A ⊆ M is finite, then the closure of B of A under
F0, F1, F2 and F3 is finite (in fact |B| ≤ 12|A|
2 + 8|A|), moreover:
(a) B ∩QM2 = (A ∩Q
M
2 ) ∪ {F2(a) : a ∈ A ∩Q
M
0 },
(b) B∩QM0 = (A∩Q
M
0 )∪{F0(b) : b ∈ A∩Q
M
1 }∪{F3(c) : c ∈ A∩Q
M
2 }
and
(c) B ∩QM1 = (A ∩Q
M
1 ) ∪ {F1(c, a) : c ∈ B ∩Q
M
2 & a ∈ B ∩Q
M
0 }.
In this case, B |= T0 and if M |= T
+
0 , then B |= T
+
0 .
Proof of the Claim.
(1) AsM is a model we have thatM 6= ∅, so at least one amongQM0 , Q
M
1 , Q
M
2
is not empty.
If QM0 6= ∅, then F2 guarantees that Q
M
2 6= ∅, so Q
M
1 6= ∅ because of
F1. If Q
M
1 6= ∅, then Q
M
0 6= ∅ because of F1. Finally, if Q
M
2 6= ∅, then
QM0 6= ∅ because of F3, and we can again argue as above.
If a ∈ QM0 , let b ∈ Q
M
2 be arbitrary. Then F1(a, b) ∈ Q
M
1 and
F0(F1(a, b)) = a. Hence, F0 is onto. Also, F3(F2(a)) = a, so F
M
3 is
onto.
(2) LetM |= T0 and Q
M
0 , Q
M
2 6= ∅. For x ∈ Q
M
0 and z ∈ Q
M
2 let F1(z, x) = y
for any y ∈ QM1 such that F0(y) = x, which exists as F
M
0 is already
onto. For x ∈ QM0 for which F2(x) is not already defined, let F2(x) = z
for any z such that F3(z) = x, which exists as F
M
3 is onto. Finally,
extend F0 and F3 to be total. The described model is a model of T
+
0 .
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(3) Let κ1 < κ2 < λ and let Q
M
0 = κ2, Q
M
1 =
κ1>λ, while QM2 =
κ1λ. For
α < κ2 let F2(α) be the function in
κ1λ which is constantly α, and
for ν ∈ κ1λ let F3(ν) = min(Rang(ν2)) if this value is < κ2, and 0
otherwise. Also, let F0(η) = lg(η) and F1(ν, α) = ν ↾ α be defined for
ν ∈ κ1λ and α < κ1.
This is a model of T0, but not of T
+
0 because F1 is not total. If this
model were to be extended to a model of T+0 with the same universe,
we would have that for every ν ∈ κ1λ
F0(F1(ν, κ1)) = κ1 & F1(ν, κ1) = η
for some η ∈ κ1>λ. As F0(η) is already defined, F0(η) = lg(η) < κ1,
which is a contradiction.
(4) Given a model M of T0. First assure that Q
M
0 , Q
M
1 , Q
M
2 6= ∅ by adding
new elements if necessary. Then make sure that F0 and F3 are total and
onto, again by adding new elements if needed. Now define F1(z, x) = y
if F0(y) = x, which is possible. Finally, declare F2(x) = z for any z
such that F3(z) = x.
(5) Suppose thatM0,M1 andM2 are models of T
+
0 with |M1|∩|M2| = |M0|,
and M0 ⊆ M1,M2. We define M3 as follows. Let |M3| = |M1|
⋃
|M2|,
and for m ∈ {0, 2, 3} let FM3m (x) = F
Ml
m (x) if x ∈ Ml for some l. This
is well defined, because M1 and M2 agree on M0. Also, the identity
F3(F2(x)) = x is satisfied in M3.
For (z, x) ∈ Q2 ×Q
M
0 such that for some l we have x ∈Ml and z /∈Ml
choose yz,x ∈ Ml such that F
Ml
0 (y) = x, which is possible by part (1)
of this Claim. Now we define F1 by letting or (z, x) ∈ Q2 ×Q
M
0
F1(z, x) =
{
FMl1 (z, x) if z, x ∈Ml,
y(z,x) otherwise.
Now it can be easily seen that M3 is a model of T
+
0 and that both M1
and M2 are it submodels. This proves the amalgamation property for
T+0 .
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To see that JEP holds, suppose that we are given two models M1, M2
of T+0 . We let M be their disjoint union and define the functions Fm
for m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
(6) Clearly B is contained in the closure of A and the size of B is as claimed.
It can be checked directly that B is closed, using the equations of T0,
and it also easily follows that B is a model of T0, or of T
+
0 if M is.
⋆1.4
Claim 1.5 T+0 has a complete model completion T
∗ which admits elimina-
tion of quantifiers, and is ℵ0-categorical. In this theory, the closure and the
algebraic closure coincide.
Proof of the Claim. We can construct T ∗ directly. T ∗ admits elimination
of quantifiers because T+0 has the amalgamation property ([ChKe] 3.5.19). It
can be seen from the construction of T ∗ that it is complete, or alternatively,
it can be seen that T ∗ has JEP and so by [ChKe] 3.5.11, it is complete. To
see that the theory is ℵ0-categorical, observe that Claim 1.4(6) implies that
for every n there are only finitely many T0-types in n-variables. Then by
the Characterisation of complete ℵ0-categorical theories ([ChKe] 2.3.13), T
∗
is ℵ0-categorical. Using the elimination of quantifiers and the fact that all
relational symbols of the language of T ∗ have infinite domains in every model
of T ∗, we can see that the algebraic closure and the definable closure coincide
in T ∗. ⋆1.5
Observation 1.6 If A,B ⊆ CT ∗ are closed and c ∈ cl(A ∪ B) \ A \ B, then
c ∈ QCT∗1 .
Proof. Notice that
cl(A ∪ B) =A ∪ B ∪ {F1(c, a) : c ∈ (A ∪ B) ∩Q2 & a ∈ (A ∪ B) ∩Q0
& {c, a} * A & {c, a} * B}
by Claim 1.4(6).
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Claim 1.7 T ∗ is NSOP3, consequently NSOP4.
Proof of the Claim. Suppose that T ∗ is SOP3 and let ϕ(x¯, y¯), and
〈a¯n : n < ω〉 exemplify this in a model M (see Definition 0.5(1)). Without
loss of generality, each a¯n is without repetition and is closed (recall Claim
1.4(6)). By the Ramsey theorem and compactness, we can assume that the
given sequence is a part of an indiscernible sequence 〈a¯k : k ∈ Z〉, hence a¯ks
form a ∆-system. Without loss of generality, each a¯k is closed under F0. Let
for k ∈ Z
X<k
def
=
⋂
m<k
cl(a¯mˆa¯k), X
>
k
def
=
⋂
m>k
cl(a¯mˆa¯k), Xk = cl(X
<
k ∪X
>
k ).
Hence Rang(a¯k) ⊆ Xk, and Xk is closed. By Claim 1.4(6), there is an a
priori finite bound on the size of Xk, hence by indiscernibility, we have that
|Xk| = n
∗ for some fixed n∗ not depending on k. Let a¯+k list Xk with no
repetition. By Observation 1.6, Claim 1.4(6), indiscernibility and the fact
that each a¯k is closed under F0, we have that
Xk ∩Q
C
0 ⊆ Rang(a¯k) and Xk ∩Q
C
2 ⊆ Rang(a¯k).
Applying Ramsey theorem again, without loss of generality we have that
〈a¯+k : k ∈ Z〉 are indiscernible. Let
w∗0
def
= {l : a¯+k1(l) = a¯
+
k2
(l) for some (equivalently all) k1 6= k2}.
If a¯+k1(l1) = a¯
+
k2
(l2) for some k1 6= k2, without loss of generality k1 < k2, by
indiscernibility. By transitivity, using k1 < k2 < k3, we get l1 = l2 ∈ w
∗
0. Let
w∗1
def
= n∗\w∗0, and let a¯ = a¯
+
k ↾ w
∗
0 and a¯
′
k = a¯
+
k ↾ w
1
∗. Hence, 〈a¯ˆ a¯
′
k : k ∈ Z〉 is
an indiscernible sequence, and Rang(a¯)∩Rang(a¯′k) = ∅ for all k. In addition,
and for k1 6= k2 we have Rang(a¯
′
k1
) ∩ Rang(a¯′k2) = ∅ and Rang(a¯ˆ a¯
′′
k) = Xk.
Now we define a model N . Its universe is ∪0≤l<3{clM(a¯ˆa¯
′
lˆa¯
′
l+1)}, and
QNi = Q
M
i ∩ N , F
N
j = ∪{Fj,l : l < 3}, where Fj,l = F
M
j ↾ clM(a¯ˆa¯
′
lˆa¯
′
l+1), or
Fj,l = F
M
j ↾ (clM(a¯ˆ a¯
′
lˆa¯
′
l+1))
2, as appropriate. Note that N is well defined,
and that it is a model of T0. N is not necessarily a model of T
+
0 , as the
function F1 may be only partial. Notice that Xl ⊆ N for l ∈ [0, 3]. We wish
to define N ′ like N , but identifying a¯+0 and a¯
+
3 coordinatwise. We shall now
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check that this will give a well defined model of T0. Note that by the proof
of Observation 1.6 we have
N ′ =
⋃
0≤l<3
Xl ∪
⋃
0≤l<3
{FN1 (c, d) : c, d ∈ Xl ∪Xl+1
& {c, d} * Xl & {c, d} * Xl+1 & F
N
1 (c, d) /∈ Xl ∪Xl+1}.
The possible problem is that FN
′
i might not be well defined, i.e. there
could perhaps be a case defined in two distinct ways. We verify that this
does not happen, by discussing various possibilities.
Case 1. For some b ∈ Rang(a¯+0 ), say b = a¯
+
0 (t), b
′ = a¯+3 (t) and j ∈ {0, 2, 3}
we have Fj(b) 6= Fj(b
′) after the identification of a¯+0 with a¯
+
3 . As a¯
+
k ’s are
closed, we have Fj(b) = a¯
+
0 (s) and Fj(b
′) = a¯+3 (s
′) for some s, s′. By indis-
cernibility, we have s = s′, hence the identification will make Fj(b) = Fj(b
′).
Case 2. For some s, t we have that F1(a¯
+
0 (s), a¯
+
0 (t)) and F1(a
+
3 (s), a
+
3 (t))
are well defined, but not the same after the identification of a¯+0 and a¯
+
3 . This
case cannot happen, as can be seen similarly as in the Case 1.
Case 3. For some τ(x, y) ∈ {F1(x, y), F1(y, x)} and d1 = a¯
+
0 (s), d2 = a¯
+
3 (s)
and some e ∈ N we have that τN (d1, e), τ
N(d2, e) are well defined but do not
get identified when N ′ is defined.
By Case 2, we have that e /∈ a¯ and s /∈ w∗0. As τ(e, d1) is well defined
and d1 ∈ X0 \ a¯, necessarily e ∈ clM(X0 ∪X1). Similarly, as τ(e, d2) is well
defined and d2 ∈ X3 \ a¯, we have e ∈ clM(X2 ∪X3). But, as F1(e, dl) is well
defined, we have e ∈ Q2 ∪Q0. Hence e ∈ clM(X0 ∪X1) \Q1 ⊆ X0 ∪X1 and
similarly e ∈ X2 ∪X3. But this implies e ∈ a¯, a contradiction.
AsM is a model of T0, F
M
0 is onto (Claim 1.4(1)). Suppose y ∈ Q
N
0 , then
for some l ∈ [0, 3) we have that y ∈ clM(Xl ∪ Xl+1), so by Observation 1.6,
we have y ∈ Xl∪Xl+1. As each Xl is closed in M , by Claim 1.4(6) each Xl is
a model of T+0 , so y ∈ Rang(F
M
0 ), hence y ∈ Rang(F
N
0 ) and y ∈ Rang(F
N ′
0 ).
We can similarly prove that FN
′
3 is onto, and as each Xl is a model of T
+
0 we
have by Claim 1.4(1) that QN
′
0 , Q
N ′
1 and Q
N ′
2 are all non-empty. By Claim
1.4(2), N ′ can be extended to a model of T+0 .
By the choice of ϕ and the fact that T ∗ is complete we have that
T ∗ |= (∀x¯0, x¯1, x¯2)¬[ϕ(x¯0, x¯1) ∧ ϕ(x¯1, x¯2) ∧ ϕ(x¯2, x¯0)].
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As T ∗ is the model completion of T+0 , in particular T
∗ and T+0 are cotheories,
so we have that
T ∗ |= (∀x¯0, x¯1, x¯2)¬[ϕ(x¯0, x¯1) ∧ ϕ(x¯1, x¯2) ∧ ϕ(x¯2, x¯0)],
yet in N ′ we have
N ′ |= ϕ(a¯0, a¯1) ∧ ϕ(a¯1, a¯2) ∧ ϕ(a¯2, a¯0),
by the identification of a¯0 and a¯3. This is a contradiction. ⋆1.7
Definition 1.8 (1) A theory T is said to satisfy the oak property as exhib-
ited by a formula ϕ(z¯, y¯, x¯) iff for any λ, κ there are b¯η(η ∈
κ>λ) and
c¯ν(ν ∈
κλ) and a¯i(i < κ) such that
(a) [η ⊳ ν & ν ∈ κλ] =⇒ ϕ[c¯ν , b¯η, a¯lg(η)],
(b) If η ∈ κ>λ and η 〈ˆα〉 ⊳ ν1 ∈
κλ and η 〈ˆβ〉 ⊳ ν2 ∈
κλ, while α 6= β
and i > lg(η), then ¬∃y¯ [ϕ(c¯ν1, y¯, a¯i) ∧ ϕ(c¯ν2, y¯, a¯i)],
and in addition ϕ satisfies
(c) ϕ(z¯, y¯1, x¯) ∧ ϕ(z¯, y¯2, x¯) =⇒ y¯1 = y¯2.
We allow for the replacement of CT by C
eq
T (i.e. allow y¯ to be a definable
equivalence class).
(2) We say that oak holds for T if this is true for some ϕ.
Observation 1.9 If some λ, κ exemplify that oak(ϕ) holds, then so do all
λ, κ. (This holds by the compactness theorem).
Remark 1.10 We shall not need to use this, but let us remark that witnesses
a¯, b¯, c¯ to oak(ϕ) can be chosen to be indiscernible along an appropriate index
set (a tree). This can be proved using the technique as in [Sh -c], Chapter VII,
which uses the compactness argument and an appropriate partition theorem.
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Claim 1.11 T ∗ has oak.
Proof of the Claim. Let
ϕ(z, y, x)
def
= Q2(z) ∧Q1(y) ∧Q0(x) ∧ F0(y) = x ∧ F1(z, x) = y.
Clearly, (c) of Definition 1.8 (1) is satisfied. Given λ, κ, we shall define
a model N = Nλ,κ of T
+
0 . This will be a submodel of C = CT ∗ such
that its universe consists of QN0
def
= {ai : i < κ} with no repetitions,
QN1
def
= {bη : η ∈
κ>λ} with no repetitions and QN2
def
= {cν : ν ∈
κλ} with no
repetitions, while Q0, Q1, Q2 are pairwise disjoint. We also require that the
following are satisfied in C = CT ∗ :
F0(bη) = alg(η), F1(cν , ai) = bν↾i
and that N is closed under F2 and F3. That such a choice is possible can be
seen by writing the corresponding type and using the saturativity of C.
We can check that N |= T+0 , and that N is a submodel of C when un-
derstood as a model of T+0 . Clearly, (a) from Definition 1.8(1) is satisfied
for ϕ and ai, bη, cν in place of a¯i, b¯η, c¯ν respectively. To see (b), suppose that
η, α, β, ν1, ν2 and i are as there, but d is such that ϕ(cν1, d, ai) ∧ ϕ(cν2, d, ai).
Hence F1(cν1 , ai) = F1(cν2 , ai), so ν1 ↾ i = ν2 ↾ i, a contradiction. This shows
that ϕ is a witness for T ∗ having oak. ⋆1.11
Finally, a remark showing why this research continues [Sh 457]. The
readers unfamiliar with T ∗feq can skip to the next section without loss of
generality. We use the notation for T ∗feq which was used in [DjSh 692], while
the fact that this is equivalent to the notation in [Sh 457] was explained in
[DjSh 692].
Remark 1.12 After renaming, CeqT ∗
feq
and CeqT ∗ are isomorphically embed-
dable into each other. To see this suppose that M is a model of T ∗feq.
Let A = {xα : α < α
∗} be a set of representatives of EM -equivalence
classes. By the construction of T ∗feq, for every finite F ⊆ α
∗, there is z such
that ∧α∈FF (xα, z) = xα. By the saturativity of CT ∗
feq
, there is zA ∈ CT ∗
feq
13
such that ∧α<α∗F (xα, zA) = xα. By the axioms of Tfeq it follows that
A 6= A′ =⇒ zA 6= zA′.
Now we define a model N = N0[M ] of T
∗. Its universe is
|M | ∪ (PM/EM) ∪ {zA :A is a set of representatives
of EM -equivalence classes}.
We let Q0 = P
M/EM , QN1 = P
M and
QN2 = Q
M ∪ {zA : A is a set of representatives of E
M -equivalence classes}.
The functions of N are defined as follows. We firstly let F0(x)
def
= x/EM and
F1(z, x/E) = F (x, z). Notice that F1 is well defined, because if z ∈ M then
certainly F (x, z) ∈ M for all x ∈ QN1 and if z = zA for some A then the
definition of A guarantees that F (x, zA) ∈ M for every x ∈ M . Also, we
have
F0(F1(z, x/E
M)) = F0(F (x, z)) = x/E
M .
It remains to define F2 and F3. Let us first see that |Q2| ≥ |Q0|. By the
definition of T ∗feq, each equivalence class of M is infinite. Hence, the number
of distinct sets of representatives of the EM -equivalence classes is at least
|Q0|
ℵ0 ≥ |Q0|, and by the definition of Q2 we have |Q2| ≥ |Q0|. We can
choose F3 as any onto function from Q2 to Q0, and apply Claim 1.4(2).
Hence N is a model of T+0 and can be seen as a submodel of C
eq
T ∗ .
Conversely, given M a model of T ∗, we define N = N1[M ] by letting its
universe be QM1
⋃
QM2 and P
N = QM1 , while Q
N = QM2 . We let
y Ez iff FM0 (y) = F
M
0 (z) and F
N(x, z) = F1(z, F0(x)).
We also let xR z ⇐⇒ FN(x, z) = x. It is easily seen that N |= Tfeq.
Using this equivalence and the fact that oak and NSOP3 are preserved
up to isomorphism of Ceq, we obtain:
Corollary 1.13 (1) T ∗feq has oak.
(2) T ∗feq has NSOP3.
Part (2) of Corollary 1.13 was stated without proof in [Sh 500].
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2 The theorems
In this section we present two general theorems showing that under certain
cardinal arithmetic assumptions oak theories do not admit universal models.
Theorem 2.1 Assume that
(1) cf(κ) = κ < µ < µ+ < λ = cf(λ),
(2) λ < µκ,
(3) κ ≤ σ ≤ λ,
(4) There are families P1 ⊆ [λ]
κ and P2 ⊆ [σ]
κ such that
(i) for every g : σ → λ there is X ∈ P2 with {g(i) : i ∈ X} ∈ P1,
(ii) |P1| < µ
κ, |P2| ≤ λ,
(5) T is a theory of size < λ which satisfies oak(ϕ(z¯, y¯, x¯)).
Then
univ(T, λ) ≥ µκ.
Definition 2.2 For cardinals κ, µ we define
UJbdκ (µ)
def
= min{|P| : P ⊆ [µ]κ & (∀b ∈ [µ]κ)(∃a ∈ P)(|a ∩ b| = κ}.
Theorem 2.3 Assume that
(1) cf(κ) = κ < µ < µ+ < λ = cf(λ),
(2) λ < UJbdκ (µ),
(3) κ ≤ σ ≤ λ,
(4) There are families P1 ⊆ [λ]
κ and P2 ⊆ [σ]
κ such that
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(i) for every g : σ → λ there isX ∈ P2 such that |{g(i) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y | = κ
for some Y ∈ P1,
(ii) |P1| < UJbdκ (µ), |P2| ≤ λ,
(5) T has oak(ϕ(z¯, y¯, x¯)).
Then
univ(T, λ) ≥ UJbdκ (µ).
Proof. We shall use the same proof for both Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.3.
The two main Lemmas are the same for both theorems, and we shall indicate
the differences which occur toward the end of the proof. Let ai (i < κ),
bη (η ∈
κ>λ) and cν(ν ∈
κλ) exemplify the oak property of ϕ(z, y, x) for λ
and κ.
For notational simplicity, let us assume that lg(x¯) = lg(y¯) = lg(z¯) = 1.
Let C¯ = 〈Cδ : δ ∈ S〉 for some S ⊆ S
λ
κ with otp(Cδ) = µ and Cδ a closed
subset of δ, be a club guessing sequence, (i.e. for every E a club of λ, there
is δ ∈ S with Cδ ⊆ E) such that
α < λ =⇒ |{Cδ ∩ α : δ ∈ S, & α ∈ nacc(Cδ)}| < λ.
Such a sequence exists by S. Shelah’s [Sh 420] (section §1). For each δ, let
〈αδ,ζ : ζ < µ〉 be the increasing enumeration of Cδ. Let C
+ be a (saturated
enough) expansion of CT by Skolem functions for CT .
Definition 2.4 (1) For N¯ = 〈Nγ : γ ≤ λ〉 an ≺-increasing continuous
sequence of models of T of size ≤ λ, and for c, a ∈
⋃
γ<λNγ, and δ ∈ S, we
let
invN¯(c, Cδ, a)
def
= {ζ < µ : [(∃b ∈ Nαδ,ζ+1)(Nλ |= ϕ[c, b, a]) &
¬(∃b ∈ Nαδ,ζ )(Nλ |= ϕ[c, b, a])}.
(2) For a set A and δ, N¯ as above, let
invAN¯(c, Cδ)
def
=
⋃
{invN¯ (c, Cδ, a) : a ∈ A}.
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Note 2.5 Notice that invN¯(c, Cδ, a) is always a singleton or empty and that
invA
N¯
(c, Cδ) ∈ [µ]
≤|A|.
Construction Lemma 2.6 For every unbounded A∗ ∈ [µ]κ of order type
κ, there is an ≺-increasing continuous sequence N¯A∗ = 〈N
A∗
γ : γ < λ〉 of
models of T of size < λ and a set {aˆi : i < σ} of elements of N
A∗
0 such
that for every X ∈ P2, for every δ ∈ S with min(Cδ) large enough, there is
c ∈ NA∗
def
=
⋃
γ<λN
A∗
γ such that inv
{aˆi: i∈X}
N¯A∗
(c, Cδ) = A
∗.
Proof of the Lemma. Let P2 = {Xα : α < α
∗ ≤ λ}.
Given A∗. Let f = fA∗ be the increasing enumeration of A
∗, so f : κ→ µ.
For δ ∈ S let νδ
def
= 〈αδ,ζ : ζ ∈ A
∗〉 be an increasing enumeration, hence cνδ is
well defined, as is bη for η ⊳ νδ. ForX ∈ P2, let ρX be an increasing surjection
from the successor ordinals < κ onto X . By a compactness argument, we
can see that there are 〈aˆi : i < σ〉 and for X ∈ P2, sequences 〈c
X
νδ
: δ ∈ S〉,
〈bXη : η ⊳ νδ & lg(η) a successor & δ ∈ S〉 such that
η ⊳ νδ =⇒ |= ϕ[c
X
νδ
, bXη , aˆρX(lg(η))]
and the appropriate translation of (b) from Definition 1.8 holds. Let for
γ < λ the model NA
∗
γ be the reduction to L(T ) of the Skolem hull in C
+ of
{aˆi : i ∈ ∪α<γXα} ∪ {c
Xα
νδ
: α < γ & δ ∈ S ∩ γ & sup(Rang(νδ)) < γ}
∪{bXαη : α < γ & η ⊳ νδ for some δ ∈ S ∩ γ & sup(Rang(η)) < γ & lg(η) a successor}.
Hence 〈N¯A
∗
= NA
∗
γ : γ < λ〉 is ≺-increasing continuous and for γ < λ we
have |NA
∗
γ | < λ. The latter is true because in the last clause
|{Cδ ∩ α : δ ∈ S, α < γ α ∈ nacc(Cδ)}| < λ
by the choice of C¯. Given α < α∗, X = Xα and δ ∈ S with min(Cδ) ≥ α+ 1
we shall show that with
I
def
= inv
{aˆi: i∈X}
N¯A
∗ (cXνδ , Cδ)
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we have I = A∗. Notice that that ε < κ =⇒ αδ,f(ε) > α. Let i ∈ X and
let η = 〈αδ,f(ε) : ε ≤ β〉, where β + 1 = ρ
−1
X (i). We have that η ⊳ νδ and
i = ρX(lg(η)). Hence ϕ[c
X
νδ
, bXη , aˆi] holds. Let ζ = f(β). We then have that
bXη ∈ N
A∗
αδ,ζ+1
⊆ NA
∗
αδ,ζ+1
(as αδ,ζ+1 > γ), but b
X
η /∈ N
A∗
αδ,ζ
. It follows from the
property (c) of Definition 1.8 that bXη is the only b for which |= ϕ[c
X
νδ
, b, aˆi].
Hence ζ = f(β) ∈ I. So A∗ ⊆ I because every element of A∗ is f(β) for some
β as above.
In the other direction, suppose ζ ∈ I and let i ∈ X be such that ζ is in
invN¯(c
X
νδ
, Cδ, aˆi). Hence for some b ∈ N
A∗
αδ ,ζ+1
\ NA
∗
αδ ,ζ
we have |= ϕ[cXνδ , b, aˆi].
Constructing η as in the previous paragraph, we have |= ϕ[cXνδ , b
X
η , aˆi]. In
conclusion, using property (c) of Definition 1.8 again, we see that b = Bxη so
ζ = f(β) for some β. So A∗ = I.
⋆2.6
Preservation Lemma 2.7 Suppose that N and N∗ are models of T both
with universe λ, and f : N → N∗ is an elementary embedding, while
〈Nγ : γ < λ〉 and 〈N
∗
γ : γ < λ〉 are continuous increasing sequences of
models of T of cardinality < λ with
⋃
γ<λNγ = N and
⋃
γ<λN
∗
γ = N
∗.
Further suppose that {aˆα : α < κ} ⊆ N is given. Let
E
def
= {γ : (N,N∗, f) ↾ γ ≺ (N,N∗, f) & sup({f(aˆα) : α < κ}) < γ},
hence a club of λ.
Then for every c ∈ N and δ with Cδ ⊆ E we have
inv
{aˆα:α<κ}
N¯
(c, Cδ) = inv
{f(aˆα):α<κ}
N¯
(f(c), Cδ).
Proof of the Lemma. Fix c ∈ N and δ ∈ S as required, and let a = aˆα for
some α < κ. We shall see that invN¯ (c, Cδ, a) = invN¯∗(f(c), Cδ, f(a)).
Suppose ζ < µ is an element of invN¯(c, Cδ, a), so there is b ∈ Nαδ,ζ+1
with N |= ϕ[c, b, a], while there is no such b ∈ Nαδ,ζ . We have that N
∗
satisfies ϕ[f(c), f(b), f(a)]. As Cδ ⊆ E we have that αδ,ζ+1 ∈ E, and as
b ∈ Nαδ,ζ+1 , clearly f(b) ∈ N
∗
αδ,ζ+1
. Similarly, by the definition of E again, we
have f(b) /∈ N∗αδ,ζ . By the assumptions on ϕ we have
N∗ |= “(∀y)[ϕ(f(c), y, f(a)) =⇒ y = f(b)]”,
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so ζ ∈ invN¯∗(f(c), Cδ, f(a)).
In the other direction, suppose ζ < µ is an element of invN¯∗(f(c), Cδ, f(a)),
so there is b∗ ∈ N∗αδ ,ζ+1 with N
∗ |= ϕ[f(c), b∗, f(a)], while there is no such
b∗ ∈ N∗αδ ,ζ. Hence N
∗ |= ∃y (ϕ[f(c), y, f(a)]), so N |= ∃y (ϕ[c, y, a]). Let
b ∈ N be such that N |= ϕ[c, b, a]. Hence N∗ |= ϕ[f(c), f(b), f(a)]. Again by
(c) of Definition 1.8, we have f(b) = b∗, so b ∈ Nαδ,ζ+1\Nαδ,ζ by elementarity.
As this b is unique (by (c) of Definition 1.8), we have ζ ∈ invN¯(c, Cδ, a). ⋆2.7
Proof of the Theorems continued.s Theorem 2.1 [Theorem 2.3]. To con-
clude the proof of the theorems, given θ < µκ [θ < UJbdκ (µ)], we shall see that
univ(T, λ) > θ. Without loss of generality, we can assume that θ ≥ λ+ |P1|.
Given 〈N∗j : j < θ〉 a sequence of models of T each of size λ, we show
that these models are not jointly universal. So suppose they were. Without
loss of generality, the universe of each N∗j is λ. Let N¯
∗
j = 〈N
∗
γ,j : γ < λ〉
be an increasing continuous sequence of models of T of size < λ such that
N∗j =
⋃
γ<λN
∗
γ,j, for j < θ. For each A ∈ P1 (so A ∈ [λ]
κ), δ ∈ S, j < θ and
d ∈ N∗j , we compute inv
A
N¯∗j
(d, Cδ), each time obtaining an element of [µ]
≤κ.
The number of elements of [µ]≤κ obtained in this way is
≤ |P1| · |S| · θ · λ ≤ θ.
By the choice of θ [and the definition of UJbdκ (µ)], we can choose A
∗ ∈ [µ]κ
such that A∗ is not equal to any of these sets [is almost disjoint (i.e. has inter-
section of size < κ) to all these sets]. Let N
def
= NA∗ be as guaranteed to exist
by the Construction Lemma, and let {aˆi : i < σ} and N¯A∗
def
= 〈NA
∗
γ : γ ≤ λ〉
be as in that Lemma. Without loss of generality, by taking an isomorphic
copy if necessary, the universe ofN is λ. Suppose that j < θ and f : N → N∗j
is an embedding, and let
E
def
= {δ < λ : (N,N∗j , f) ↾ δ ≺ (N,N
∗
j , f)}.
Let g : σ → λ be given by g(i) = f(aˆi). Let X = Xα ∈ P2 be such that
{f(aˆi) : i ∈ X} ∈ P1, [for some Y ∈ P1 we have |{f(aˆi) : i ∈ X} ∩ Y | = κ],
and let c ∈ N be such that inv
{aˆi: i∈X}
N¯
(c, Cδ) = A
∗. By the Preservation
Lemma, we have inv
{f(aˆi): i∈X}
N¯∗j
(f(c), Cδ) = A
∗ [inv
{f(aˆi): i∈X}
N¯∗j
(f(c), Cδ) ∩ A
∗
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includes inv
{f(aˆi): i∈X}∩Y
N¯∗j
(f(c), Cδ) ∩ a
∗, which has cardinality κ]. This is a
contradiction with the choice of A∗.
⋆2.1
Remark 2.8 We comment on the assumptions used in Theorems 2.1 and
2.3. Although the theorems do not use the assumption cf(µ) = κ, this
situation is the natural one for the assumptions given. If cf(µ) ≤ κ < µ we
have ppJbdκ (µ) ≤ UJbdκ (µ). For example, we have the following
Corollary 2.9 Let T be a theory with the oak property. Suppose that
cf(µ) = κ < µ < µ+ < λ = cf(λ) and λ < UJbdκ (µ) (e.g. ppJbdκ (µ) > λ) while
2κ ≤ λ, and
for some n, cov(λ, κ+n+1, κ+n+1, κ+n) = λ (∗λ,κ)
then univ(T, λ) ≥ UJbdκ (µ).
Proof. We use Theorem 2.3 with σ = κ+n+1 for n as in (∗λ,κ). By the choice
of n, there are P1,P2 as required and of cardinality λ.⋆2.9
Note that the consistency of the failure of (∗λ,κ) for any λ ≥ κ
+ω, κ = cf(κ)
is not known, and that for our purposes even weaker statements suffice. See
[Sh 460].
If ℵ0 < κ = cf(µ) and for all θ < µ we have θ
κ < µ, then
ppJbdκ (µ) = µ
κ = UJbdκ (µ)
(by [Sh -g], Chapter VII, §1).
If λ > κ = cf(κ) and σ = λ, if we cannot find P1 and P2 as in Theorem
2.3(i) with |P1| + |P2| ≤ λ, then for every P ⊆ [λ]
κ with |P| ≤ λ, we can
find X ∈ [λ]λ such that (∀a ∈ P)(|a ∩X| < κ), which is a rather strong
requirement.
Another comment is the necessity of introducing the cardinal σ at the
outset of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.3. In most instances of cardinal arith-
metic, assuming that the other requirements are satisfied, requirement (4)
cannot be fulfilled with κ = σ. But if for example λ = λ[σ] (for a definition
20
see [Sh 460]; the equality holds e.g. if λ < ℵσ), and κ < σ is such that
σκ < µ, and for some sequence 〈λi : i < κ〉 of regulars increasing to µ the
reduced product (Πi<κλi/J
bd
κ ) is λ
+-directed, the assumptions of Theorem
2.1 will hold. In fact, by [Sh 460] we have
Corollary 2.10 In Theorem 2.1, if (1)+(2) hold, while κ = cf(µ) < iω ≤ µ,
then for every large enough σ ∈ (κ,iω), parts (3) and (4) of the assumptions
of Theorem 2.1 hold as well, so univ(T, λ) ≥ µκ.
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